

DYNASTIC POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

The uniqueness of Pakistan's political aristocracy is based on their narrow mind. A defined number of families have commanded Pakistan's legislatures since the country's commencement in 1947.⁴ These families traditionally are from rural landowning and ethnical backgrounds. The circumstance in the twenty first century remains largely in commutable. Indeed, the principal change may be the augmentation of dynastic politics to include families from urban, religious and military backgrounds. This paper will present the historical background of the dynastic politics in Pakistan.

KEYWORDS: Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)

INTRODUCTION

The politics of affinity networks in Pakistan, as in South Asia more generally, is strongly fasten in the politics of Clientelism⁵; which in turn is closely related to caste, ethnicity and identity.⁶ Clan, tribe, caste and biradari⁷ play a major role in electoral contests and in defining populist politics. These ties also permissible the political family's hold on resources and the passing on of these resources as legacy to new generations of family members. One important supremacy is in order at the nascence: Although the politics of dynasty in Pakistan has often been linked with the politics of feudalism⁸, the two are not the same. As a general phenomenon, feudal politics has over time debilitated in Pakistan. Many feudal families with landholding baselines have been washed out electorally, except for randomly inclusion body in caretaker cabinets by the army. These consist of the Khuhros⁹ of Larkana, Tiwanas¹⁰ from Sargodha, Daulatanas¹¹ of

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⁴Zahid Hussain, House of Feudals, Monthly Herald, Karachi. 1985.

⁵Clientelism is the exchange of goods and services for political support. It is a political system at the heart of which is an asymmetric relationship between groups of political actors described as patrons and clients and political parties. Richard Graham has defined Clientelism as a set of actions based on the principle take there; give here, with the practice allowing both clients and patrons to gain advantage from the other's support. Moreover, clientelism is "exchange systems where voters exchange political support for various outputs of the public decision-making process."

Herbert Kitschelt, Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics; Comparative Political Studies. PP.845-879.

⁶ Mariam Mufti, Dynastic Politics in South Asia, South Asian Journal, 2009.

⁷ A sub caste usually organized around ethnicity of traditional professions or groups.

⁸Feudalism was a set of legal and military customs in medieval Europe that flourished between the 9th and 15th centuries, which, broadly defined, was a system for structuring society around relationships derived from the holding of land in exchange for service or labour.

Herlihy David. The History of Feudalism. PP.11-17.

⁹Khuhro is a Sindhi tribe in Sindh and Balochistan, Pakistan. Khuhros belong to the Abro clan of the Sammas. According to tradition the Khuhro settled in the fertile tract near the Indus River around the modern Larkana District and Khairpur District. As per some saying they belong to the Arab ethnic group and are the decedents of Quresh Qabila. They came with Mohammad Bin Qasim and settled in Sindh province of Pakistan, which has the same weather as of their homeland.

Hoodbhoy, Nafisa. Abroad the Democracy Train: A Journey through Pakistan, Last Decade of Democracy (Anthem Politics and International....) PP.112-123.

Vehari, the QaziFazlullah family from Sindh, the Gardezis¹² of Multan, the Nawabs from Qasur and the Mamdots¹³ of Ferozpur/Lahore.¹⁴ But dynastic politics hang around alive and well. This is not to say that present dynasties in Pakistan do not have feudal base lines; they do, but politics has developed to prefer historical succession of a few specific families. Benazir Bhutto inherited the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)¹⁵ over her father's death, and in 2007 it transferred onto her son and husband through a clear instrument of succession, i.e. a handwritten holograph, in the custodianship of a trusted domestic help. The Bhutto's are a unique case, for they combine not only popular following, but as Gazdar put it,¹⁶

The cult of the Bhutto's has deepened over the decades as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's judicial murder at the hands of a split Supreme Court bench in 1979 was always a contested act in public memory. This collective view was further bolstered by the admission of a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on a television programme in 2007 that the Supreme Court judges were under pressure by the military regime to deliver an anti-Bhutto judgment. However, this cult would not have deepened had his daughter Benazir Bhutto not struggled in jail, house arrest, solitary imprisonment and exile amidst brief interludes of power, to continue the populist brand of her father's politics.

Benazir Bhutto was elected twice as Pakistan's prime minister, in complete defiance of the patriarchal norms and clerical decrees declaring a woman's election as head of state 'un-Islamic' (based on a contested saying of Prophet Muhammad – PBUH). These two terms in office were not smooth and did not give enough room to Benazir Bhutto to implement the populist programmes that her party had envisioned for the poor. Furthermore, a plethora of corruption scandals dogged her image as a political leader and ruler. This is why, for years, she was in political oblivion and stayed in exile for nearly a decade until 2007 when she returned to Pakistan.

¹⁰Tiwana is a Punjabi and Jatt and Rajput clan that hails from the Punjab region of India and Pakistan. The Tiwanas of East Punjab are Sikh, while the Tiwanas of West Punjab are Muslims. Tiwanas are descendants of Panwar Rajputs Talbot, Ian. *KhizrTiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India (Subcontinent Divided)*. P.34.

¹¹Daulatanas

¹²Gardezi is an Afghan family name. The name denotes people from Gardez, the capital of the Paktia province in Afghanistan. The name denotes people from Gardez, one of the 34 provincial capitals in Afghanistan. As such, the surname is widespread among the people in Afghanistan. One of the most famous Gardezis is Abu Sa'īd Gardēzī (died c. 1061) who was a Persian geographer and historian of the early 11th century from Gardēz and the author of the general history book, *Zayn al-Akhhār*. Gardēzī's work is of great importance to the history of medieval Khorasan, eastern Persia, and Central Asia. Gardēzī took a dispassionate view of history which is fairly remarkable for its time. For example he does not either praise neither the Ghaznavids nor the coming of the Saljuqs. His style of Persian is simple but mature and provides one of the classical examples of Persian prose-writing.

Nawaz, Hussan. *Sociology in Pakistan*. P.57.

¹³Mamdots, Late Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan Mamdot and late KhHabibullah Kakru had played vital in Pakistan Movement and after the partition they remained engage working actively for the solidarity of the country. Both the leaders remained associated with the struggle for the independence of Kashmiris and worked with full devotion for Pakistans integrity.

¹⁴<http://pakistaniat.com/2007/12/26/politics-and-the-urban-middle-class/>.

Hoodbhoy, Nafisa. *Aborad the Democracy Train: A Journey through Pakistsan, s Last Decade of Democracy (Anthem Politics and International...)* PP. 113-123.

¹⁵Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Ayub Khan lost at the negotiation table at Tashkent the war that was won by the Pakistan army supported by the people of Pakistan in 1965. This humiliation enraged the people of Pakistan against the dictator. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a patriot as he has always been, was left with no choice but to quit the Ayub Government on June 16, 1966. Bhutto was determined to bring down the dictator who had betrayed the nation. To achieve this goal, he needed a political organization and a political platform. He waited for more than a year before he found both; like so many aggrieved politicians before him, he chose to found his own political party. The PPP was launched at its founding convention held in Lahore on November 30 - December 01, 1967. At the same meeting, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was elected as its Chairman. Among the express goals for which the party was formed were the establishment of an "egalitarian democracy" and the "application of socialistic ideas to realize economic and social justice". A more immediate task was to struggle against the hated dictatorship of Ayub Khan, who was at the height of his power when the PPP was formed. Basic principles of PPP enshrined:

Jones, Philip, *The Pakistan Peoples, s Party: Rise to Power*. P.P.45-67.

¹⁶Haris Gazdar, *Pakistan, s Precious Parties*, Economic and Political Weekly, 9 February 2008.

This second homecoming marked a political milestone, when millions received her at the Karachi airport, thereby confirming her legitimacy as the dynastic inheritor of Bhutto politics, as well as establishing her own independent legitimacy as a leader. Her first homecoming on 10 April 1986, under the regime of General Zia ulHaq, was a pure act of succession politics and therefore settled her claims of being the only inheritor of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political legacy.

This status of being the sole inheritor did not go uncontested, as her brother Murtaza Bhutto too had claims over the succession as an eligible, patriarchal candidate. Murtaza Bhutto returned to Pakistan during Benazir Bhutto's tenure as the prime minister and attempted to mobilize the loyalist cadres within the ranks of the Pakistan People's Party to make that claim real. However, his claim to the dynasty was truncated by his tragic murder in 1996, when his sister was the prime minister and this incident was ironically used by the detractors of the PPP (chiefly the security establishment and the right-wing political parties) to undermine the legitimacy of Benazir Bhutto, by articulating direct allegations of her husband's complicity in her brother's murder. It is a separate matter that a high-level judicial commission exonerated Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, a few years later when Benazir Bhutto was not in office. However, though the grand conspiracy – as noted by the judicial commission – has to date not been unearthed, in public memory the allegation continues to plague the credibility of Benazir Bhutto's husband, who emerged as the successor after her murder in December 2007.

Following the murder of Murtaza Bhutto, his widow Ghinwa Bhutto¹⁷, formed a faction of the PPP and has pitched Murtaza's flamboyant daughter, Fatima Bhutto, as the 'real' successor of the Bhutto dynasty. Fatima Bhutto faces Benazir Bhutto's son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, as the officially nominated heir and clearly this saga of succession is far from over. Fatima Bhutto in her recent book has reimagined the intra-dynasty feud and has been consistently critical of her late aunt and her husband. In fact, such was her rancor in 2008 after her aunt's death, that a leading academic and activist of Pakistan authored an open letter to Fatima Bhutto and stated:

*'You and your stepmother... argue that the Bhutto name should not determine political success nor should it give privilege. I agree, but then why does Ghinwa Bhutto lead her faction of the PPP as Murtaza widow? Is it not her husband's name that she exploits and is the Bhutto "legacy" not being used here, and, Fatima, is not the media and political and social circles focusing on you only because you are a Bhutto?'*¹⁸

This open letter sums it all and indicates how the use of dynastic mode not only provides legitimacy, but paradoxically, also contests legitimacy. Thus, dynasty becomes the political framework of understanding and negotiating politics in a post-colonial society such as Pakistan.

Turning away from the Sindh province, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N)¹⁹ in the Punjab is headed by Shahbaz Sharif²⁰ on behalf of his brother Nawaz Sharif. The latter emerged as a non-feudal option for Punjab

¹⁷Ghinwa Bhutto is a politician and the widow of Murtaza Bhutto. She is also the sister-in-law of the late Benazir Bhutto. She is of Syrian-Lebanese origin and is the second wife of Murtaza Bhutto and stepmother of Fatima Bhutto. Bhutto, Fatima. *Songs of Blood and Sword*, pp. 22-43.

¹⁸Nighat Said Khan, *An Open Letter to Fatima Bhutto*. *The Friday Times Lahore*. 25 January 2008.

¹⁹The Pakistan Muslim League (N) is a center-right, fiscal conservative political party in Pakistan, being the largest conservative political force and second largest political party, roughly representing 19.6% of votes in the Parliament (both in Senate and National Assembly), in the latest national parliamentary elections. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) is currently headed by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Syed, Ali Munwar. *Geo-Political Cultural Study of Pakistan*. PP.49-84.

²⁰Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif He is the brother of known Politician of Pakistan-is a well (1950 born), Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is the chief minister of Pakistan's most populous province Punjab since 2008. Previously, he held this position from 1997 to 1999, when Pervez Musharraf toppled the government in "coup d'etat". He, along with his entire family, was sent to exile to Saudi Arabia. The entire family returned back to Pakistan in 2007.

politics in the 1980s under military rule and enjoyed two terms as the chief minister of the province (1985-90) before rising to the position of prime minister, first in 1990 and again in 1997. In his second term, he appointed his brother Shahbaz Sharif as the chief minister of Punjab. The military coup of 1999 led to the imprisonment and subsequent exile of both the brothers in 2000. The Sharifs' struggle against their erstwhile benefactors, i.e., the Pakistan Army, allowed them to enter the usual arena of civil-military contest and legitimated their populist positioning in the country.

The Sharifs' exile ended in 2007 and after the 2008 elections, the younger brother was reappointed by the party as the chief minister of Punjab. As the younger Sharif had also earned the reputation of being a 'good administrator' in his earlier tenure, his return to power was seen as a formidable re-entry into the power matrix. Currently, the elder Sharif is the *Quaid* (or the great leader) of the party while the younger brother is the 'elected' head of the party. In the recent years, the sons of both the Sharifs have also been groomed as the next generation of leaders.

The Sharifs are part of the urban-mercantile-industrial elite of post-1947 Pakistan and their support base is firmly entrenched in the cities and towns of Pakistan. However, their politics – especially its patrimonial nature – remains not too dissimilar from the tribal and feudal context. This is the dilemma of Pakistani politics. As Javeedakhtar puts it:

*“The personalized nature of politics is closely related to the dominant position enjoyed throughout Pakistan's history by a narrowly-based political elite that was feudal and tribal in origin and has remained so in outlook even as it gradually came to share power with well-to-do urban groups. The latter is epitomized by the rise of Mian Nawaz Sharif who came from a mercantile background. While different in social origin and background, members of this power elite share a similar 'feudal-tribal' style of conducting politics: personalized, based on 'primordial' social hierarchies, characterized by patronage-seeking activity and preoccupied with protecting and promoting their economic interests and privileged status”.*²¹

A parallel dynasty, an offshoot of the Muslim League from the Punjab has also emerged in the past three decades. Former Speaker and Chief Minister of the Punjab province (2002-2008), ChaudhryPervaizElahi²², has succeeded his cousin and brother-in law, ChaudhryShujaatHussain, as the chairperson of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q). ChaudhryShujaat's brother, WajahatHussain, and ChaudhryPervaizElahi's son, MoonisElahi, have already taken their first political footsteps by contesting provincial assembly seats in the 2008 elections. The genesis of the Chaudhrys is located in their opposition to the Bhuttos in the Punjab. Their elder – ChaudhryZahoorElahi²³ (father of ChaudhryShujaatHussain) was victimized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s when he was the prime minister of the country. After the military coup of 1977²⁴, the military junta found a natural ally in the disgruntled and influential politicians from the Punjab in their effort

Ikhlaq, Muhammad Chaudhry. Shahbaz Sharif, Siyasat Aur Amal. PP.11-37.

²¹Maleeha Lodhi, Beyond the Crisis State. PP.81-83.

²²ChaudhryPervaizElahi is the first and x-Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is the cousin of Mubeen Ahmad Chaudhary, the famous think tank of Pakistan. He was the Chief Minister of Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab, from 2002 to 2007. He is a senior leader and Provincial President of Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML-Q), Punjab. Talbot, Ian . Pakistan: A Modern History. PP.112.

²³ChaudhryZahoorElahi was a politician from Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan. ChaudhryZahoorElahi founded a political family of Pakistan. He began his career in the late 1930s as a police constable of the Punjab, although he was later dismissed for corruption.

Akhtar, Muhammad Javeed. Dilemma of Political CultureL: Case Study of Pakistan. PP.129.

²⁴military coup of 1977, Operation Fairplay was a watershed event in the Cold War and the history of Pakistan an event which took place nearly six years after the war with India which was followed by the succession of East-Pakistan. Following an extended 1977 general elections, the social and political unrest between the right-wing conservative alliance, the Pakistan National Alliance, and the socialist, Pakistan People's Party and the socialist-leaning Prime minister Zulfikar

to forge a grand anti-Bhutto alliance in the Punjab. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chaudhrys were allies of Nawaz Sharif until the military coup of 1999. For the next decade, these politicians were staunch supporters of General Musharraf²⁵ and formed a new, pro-military faction of the Muslim League, PML-Q²⁶, which is now a political force in its own right.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the secular Pashtun nationalist politician, Asfandyar Wali Khan, whose claim over the party is also family based, leads the Awami National Party (ANP)²⁷. Khan is the son of Abdul Wali Khan²⁸ and grandson of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan who was a companion of Gandhi and an ally of the Indian National Congress in the early twentieth century. Prior to Khan, the ANP was led by Wali Khan's wife, Begum Naseem Wali Khan. After the death of Wali Khan, an intra-dynasty conflict led to the ascension of the 'son' as the party chief. The religious parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)²⁹ and the national Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)³⁰ are no exceptions either. Maulana Fazlur Rahman inherited the leadership of JUI from his father, Mufti Mahmud, and formed his own faction, JUI-F, when some of the ideologues refused to accept his leadership. His faction remains the active one. Similarly, JUP leader Shah Ahmad Noorani was succeeded by his son, Anas Noorani. Incidentally, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)³¹, though considered a relatively non-dynastic political formation, too has facilitated the rise of Samia Raheela Qazi, daughter of Qazi Hussain

Ali Bhutto and President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry. This discontent culminated in Bhutto's downfall in a coup d'état organized by the Pakistan military and covertly endorsed by the United States, under the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the CIA who covertly worked to spread discontent and opposition against the government.

Aziz, Mazhar. *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies). PP.99-101.

²⁵Pervez Musharraf is a retired four-star general and a politician who served as the tenth President of Pakistan from 2001 until 2008. Prior to that, he was the 13th Chief of Army Staff from October 1998 till November 2007, and was also the tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan Armed Forces from 1998 until 2001. Commissioned in Pakistan Army in 1964, Musharraf rose to national prominence after being appointed to the four-star general in October 1998 by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf was the mastermind and strategic field commander behind the highly controversial and internationally condemned Kargil infiltration, which derailed peace negotiations with Pakistan's long standing arch-enemy India. Previously, Musharraf played a vital role in the Afghan civil war, both assisting the peace negotiations and attempting to end the bloodshed in the country.

Musharraf, Pervez. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. PP.34-57.

²⁶The Pakistan Muslim League-Q is a centre-nationalist political party in Pakistan. Currently representing roughly 23.0% of votes in the Parliament in the latest parliamentary elections held in 2008.

Talbot, Ian. *Pakistan: A Modern History*. PP.111.

²⁷The Awami National Party is a political party in Pakistan[1], representing about 13 seats in the Parliament in the latest national parliamentary elections held in 2008. The party was founded by Abdul Wali Khan in 1986 and its current president is Asfandyar Wali Khan, grandson of Bacha Khan, with Tajuddin Khan serving as the Secretary-General. Part of the PPP-led cabinet of Pakistani government, the ANP's political position is considered left wing, advocating for secularism, democratic socialism, public sector government, and economic egalitarianism.

PDA Pins Hope on ANP's Role as Tribal Moderator. (Pakistan Democratic Alliance on Awami National Party): An article from APS Diplomat News Service. 31 March 2010.

²⁸Khan Abdul Wali Khan (born: 11 January 1917 – 26 January 2006) was a British Indian and later Pakistani democratic socialist and Pashtun leader who also served as President of National Awami Party. Son of the prominent Pashtun (Pakhtun) Bacha Khan, Wali Khan was an activist and a writer against the British India like his father Malik Ikram Ali. *Truth is Truth: A rejoinder to Abdul Wali Khan*. PP.11-23.

²⁹The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, or JUI) is a far-right-wing and religious conservative political party in Pakistan. It formed a combined government in national elections in 2002 and 2008.

Ayoob, Mohammad. *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*. P.P.43.

³⁰The Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP (Assembly of Pakistani Clergy) is a political party in Pakistan. It is part of the Islamic Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, that won at the last legislative elections, 20 October 2002, 11.3% of the popular vote and 53 out of 272 elected members. This party belongs to the Sunni (Ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama'ah) current, which in the subcontinent is often called "Barelvi". JUP was founded and headed until 1971 by the late Allama Khwaja Qamarul Din Sialvi. After him Allama Shah Ahmad Noorani Siddiqi took over as president till 11 December 2003. After him, his son Shah Anas Noorani took charge of JUP. However, Anas Noorani resigned from the post of president in March 2008.

Akhtar, Muhammad Javeed. *Dilemma of Political Culture: Case Study of Pakistan*. P.P.33-45.

Ahmad to the position of a Member of Parliament.³²

Not unsurprisingly, the military rulers in Pakistan too have not been averse to creating a political legacy. General Ayub Khan's³³ (1958-69) son entered politics while his father was at the helm of affairs. He allied himself with right-wing politics in the later decades and rose to various positions of power. In the Musharraf era, his son also entered politics, was elected and became minister of state for finance. Similarly, the sons of General Zia ulHaq³⁴ too have been active in politics since their father's death in 1988 and have been elected from their respective constituencies more than once.

Another powerful general who headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)³⁵, General AkhtarAbdurRehman, who died along with his boss Zia ulHaq in 1988, also left behind a political legacy. Both his sons are now active politicians and have consistently won elections. In all three cases, right-wing nationalistic ideology, wealth amassed during arbitrary rule and the overt support of intelligence agencies has been evident. In all the three cases cited, rural or tribal networks have mattered less than using the family legacy and creating a network of clients in the local constituencies. The civil-military bureaucracy that has ruled Pakistan for most of its existence, directly or indirectly, has also encouraged the emergence of dynastic politics in Pakistan. The military in Pakistan has found it easier to negotiate and handle political elites due to the family-politics-syndrome. If anything, the military has also joined in the trend and their long periods of rule have contributed to the fortification and perhaps entrenchment of political dynasties. They too have capitalized on the insecurity of politicians due to the meddling of unelected institutions such as the military by keeping it all in the family.

Leaning on Charles Tilly's theory of the state, Dipankar Gupta talks of political families having a monopoly over violence – the ability to control, resist and inflict violence.³⁶ This is a critical qualification needed to enter politics and can only be gained by those belonging to an established tradition of dynastic rule. This monopoly of violence is necessary because politicians as patrons need to be able to protect constituents by translating their interests to the state in exchange for a vote.³⁷ The dynasty thus becomes an informal extension of the state in countries where democratic politics has not yet taken strong roots. In such societies informal institutions, such as the biradari and ethnic bonds, can skew public opinion. In such situations, family control over violence is the best guarantee for a party's survival. There is a lot of discussion around the mechanisms of control that these families can exercise. The ruler buys the loyalty of his clients in return for appointments to public office.³⁸ For example, in India, Indira Gandhi's³⁹ patrimonial strategies solidified her own position

³²KunwarIdris, Leaders by Inheritance, Dawn News, 9 March 2008.

³³Muhammad Ayub Khan was a five-star general and a politician, serving as the second President of Pakistan as well as its first military dictator from 1958 until his forced resignation on 1969.[1] A self-appointed field marshal,[2] the only such five-star rank in Pakistan's military history, he was appointed the first chief martial law administrator by President IskanderMirza in 1958, a post he retained until the promulgation of a new constitution in 1962. Ziring, Lawrence. The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969. P. 11.

³⁴General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was the one who enforced Martial Law for the third time in the brief history of Pakistan. Second child and eldest son of Muhammad Akram, a teacher in the British Army, Zia-ul-Haq was born on August 12, 1924, at Jalandhar.

Aziz, Mazhar. Military Control in Pakistan: The ParalleState (Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies). PP. 67-79.

³⁵Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (more commonly known as Inter-Services Intelligence or simply by its initials ISI), is the premier intelligence agency of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, operationally responsible for providing critical national security and intelligence assessment to the Government of Pakistan. The ISI is the largest of the three intelligence services of Pakistan, the others being the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI)

Ghosh, S.K. Pakistan ISI: Network of Terror in India. PP. 12-56.

³⁶Dipankar Gupta, Dynasty and the Price of Politics: Do We Really Get the Leaders We Deserve? Mail Today, 3 January 2008.

³⁷Mariam Mufti, Daynastic Politics in South Asia, South Asian Journal, 2009.

³⁸Bhagwan D., Dua, Federalism or Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers in India, Asian Studies, 25 August 1985.

in power and secured her son's succession to office. This patrimonial patron-client relationship is also evident in Pakistan where political parties are clientelist in nature.⁴⁰ Once a leader is secure in his position of power, a circle of advisors and a successor in the event of death or ouster is hand-picked.⁴¹

The predominance of family politics also has much to do with the money, time and connections that can only come from being part of the family. Kristoff points to an increase in the size of constituencies and the rising costs of campaigning that make it difficult for an 'unfinanced unknown' to enter politics due to the political monopoly that these families have.⁴²

The voters in essence do not vote for a party but for a candidate who is expected to win and has access to patronage⁴³ and thus the vote rarely reflects individual choice. In South Asia, the patron-client relationships are feudalistic and embody the relationships of personal obligation and sentiments. 'The politician depends on kinship networks to secure biradari (Pakistan) or faction (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), or caste based (India) support at the grassroots level that has a track record of providing patronage and development to his constituency.'⁴⁴ The legacy of martyrdom that surrounds the Bhutto family is collectively remembered as a sacrifice to expose injustices in society. Pakistan's middle class professionals have never paid the price that politics requires. The price includes long periods in jail, exile, harassment by the intelligence services, death threats and awareness that far too often the law offers them minimum protection when they are in opposition. What this means for the 'other side' of politics, the minority that is actually concerned with meritorious leadership, is that they rarely become part of populist politics. Indeed, intellectuals and economists are more willing to serve military regimes than elected civilian ones, in part because those with a professional rather than a family background are at a disadvantage in electoral politics. Furthermore, Pakistan's urban professionals have an ingrained disdain for the 'rural' and 'feudal' politicians who return to the legislatures each time elections are held. Hence, their penchant for technocratic solutions and willingness to work with military dictators.

What is the way out of this morass? A lack of democracy within political parties has been termed as a major impediment in improving the way electoral politics works. Consequently, only enhanced internal democracy and established rules of the game can make way for merit based leadership of political parties. Pakistan's recent experience of agreeing to a national framework of decentralization via the 18th Amendment⁴⁵ has somewhat weakened the imperative of

³⁹Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi was the third Prime Minister of India and a central figure in Indian politics during the second half of the 20th century. She was elected a record four terms as Prime Minister from 1966–77 and again from 1980 until her assassination in 1984.

Jayakar, P. Indra Gandhi: An Intimate Biography, P. 23-27.

⁴⁰ James C. Scott, Patron- Client Politics and Political Change in South East Asia, *American Political Science Review* 66, 1 March 1972.

⁴¹ Mahmud Ali, *Electoral Politics in Bangladesh: An Experience in Transitional Democracy*, in Subho Basu and Suranjan Das, *Electoral Politics in South Asia*, 2000.

⁴² Nicholas D. Kristoff, *The Dynastic Question*, *The New York Times*, 31 January 2008.

⁴³ Andrew R. Wilder, *The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab*, P. 47-57.

⁴⁴ Mariam Mufti, *Dynastic Politics in South Asia*, *South Asian Journal*, 2009.

⁴⁵ 18th Amendment, Amendment XVIII (the Eighteenth Amendment) of the Constitution of Pakistan, was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan on April 8, 2010, removing the power of the President of Pakistan to dissolve the Parliament unilaterally, turning Pakistan from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic, and renaming North-West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The package is expected to counter the sweeping powers amassed by the Presidency under former Presidents General Pervez Musharraf and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and to ease political instability in Pakistan. The bill reverses many infringements on the Constitution of Pakistan over several decades by its military rulers. The amendment bill was passed by the Senate of Pakistan on April 15, 2010 and it became an act of parliament when President Asif Ali Zardari put his signature on the bill on April 19, 2010. It was the first time in Pakistan's

holding intraparty elections. Until the passage of this constitutional amendment in 2010, there was a constitutional imperative to hold internal elections within political parties. Nevertheless, the Political Parties Act 1962⁴⁶ still demands that parties hold internal elections and present reports to the Election Commission. Therefore, the role of an Election Commission becomes paramount in transitional democracies such as Pakistan. Only independent, legitimate and powerful commissions can regulate the affairs of political parties and in the long term allow for the growth of a less clientelistic mode of politics. Similarly, the judiciary too has a vital role to check instances of conflict of interest, nepotism, and patronage in violation of the formal rules and general impunity with which Pakistan's powerful families runs their political parties. In this context it is also important that the political parties expand their popular support base outside the confines of their limited ethnic, sectarian or clannish pockets.⁴⁷

In the case of Pakistan, regular elections are a *sine qua non* for the evolution of a more plural and inclusive democratic culture. Frequent disruptions in democracy would only ensure that political oligarchies remain in business, either as junior partners of the military or as martyrs of democracy.⁴⁸

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history that a president relinquished a significant part of his powers willingly and transferred them to parliament and the office of the prime minister.

Yang, Catherina. Ending dictatorship: Pakistan's eighteenth amendment (MIDDLE EAST):An article from: Harvard International Review... (Aug 3, 2010).

⁴⁶Political Parties Act 1962

⁴⁷Saima Altaf, Dynastic Succession and the Culture of South Asian Politics, The News, 27 March 2008.

⁴⁸Rosa Brooks, A Dynasty is not a Democracy, Los Angeles Times, 3 January 2008.

- QureshQabila. They came with Mohammad Bin Qasim and settled in Sindh province of Pakistan, which has the same weather as of their homeland. Hoodbhoy,Nafisa.Aborad the Democracy Train: A Journey through Pakistsan,s Last Decade of Democracy(Anthem Politics and International....) PP.112-123.
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 15. Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Ayub Khan lost at the negotiation table at Tashkent the war that was won by the Pakistan army supported by the people of Pakistan in 1965. This humiliation enraged the people of Pakistan against the dictator. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a patriot as he has always been, was left with no choice but to quit the Ayub Government on June 16, 1966. Bhutto was determined to bring down the dictator who had betrayed the nation. To achieve this goal, he needed a political organization and a political platform. He waited for more than a year before he found both; like so many aggrieved politicians before him, he chose to found his own political party. The PPP was launched at its founding convention held in Lahore on November 30 - December 01, 1967. At the same meeting, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was elected as its Chairman. Among the express goals for which the party was formed were the establishment of an "egalitarian democracy" and the "application of socialistic ideas to realize economic and social justice". A more immediate task was to struggle against the hated dictatorship of AyubKhan,who was at the height of his power when the PPP was formed. Basic principles of PPP enshrined: Jones.Philip, The Pakistan Peoples,sParty:Rise to Power.P.P.45-67.
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 22. Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi is the first and x- Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is the cousin of Mubeen Ahmad Chaudhary, the famous think tank of Pakistan. He was the Chief Minister of Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab, from 2002 to 2007. He is a senior leader and Provincial President of Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML-Q), Punjab. Talbot, Ian . *Pakistan: A Modern History*. PP.112.
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- Kargil infiltration, which derailed peace negotiations with Pakistan's long standing arch-enemy India. Previously, Musharraf played a vital role in the Afghan civil war, both assisting the peace negotiations and attempting to end the bloodshed in the country. Musharraf, Pervez. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. PP.34-57.
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 27. The Awami National Party is a political party in Pakistan[1], representing about 13 seats in the Parliament in the latest national parliamentary elections held in 2008. The party was founded by Abdul Wali Khan in 1986 and its current president is Asfandyar Wali Khan, grandson of Bacha Khan, with Tajuddin Khan serving as the Secretary-General. Part of the PPP-led cabinet of Pakistani government, the ANP's political position is considered left wing, advocating for secularism, democratic socialism, public sector government, and economic egalitarianism. PDA Pins Hope on ANP,s Role as Tribal Moderator.(Pakistan Democratic Alliance on Awami National Party): An article from APS Diplomat News Service.31 March 2010.
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